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THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY VOLUME CIII, NO. 11, NOVEMBER 2006 THE METAPHYSICS OF MENTAL CAUSATION* debate has been raging in the philosophy of mind for at least the past two decades. It concerns whether the mental can -Z. JLmake a causal difference to the world. Suppose that I am read ing the newspaper and it is getting dark. I switch on the light, and continue with my reading. One explanation of why my switching on of the light occurred is that a desiring with a particular content (that I continue reading), a noticing with a particular content (that it is getting dark), and a believing with a particular content (that by switching on the light I could continue reading) occurred in me, and these events caused my switching on of the light. This explanation works by citing the intentional contents of mental phenomena as causes of that action. It is because the intentional causes have the contents that they do, and because those contents play a causal role in bringing about my action, that my action is causally explained.
We think that a sufficient causal explanation can be given for my action solely in terms that make reference to its intentional causes and their intentional properties. However we have every reason to believe that there is a different causal story, a physical one, which can be told about my switching on of the light. This one will explain the physical movements that constitute my switching on of the light in terms that speak only of the physical events in my body and their properties. And we think that this story will be independent of the finger's flipping of the switch. So it looks like there is just one piece of behavior that needs explaining when I switch on the light, namely, the physical movements of my finger that constitute that action. We thus appear to have two competing causal-explanatory stories that we can tell about a single piece of behavior. One way of causally explaining the movements of my body that constitute my switching on of the light will mention only the mental properties of their intentional causes. Another way will mention only the physical properties of those causes.
As this way of developing the problem clearly illustrates, the difficulty cannot be resolved simply by maintaining that both stories allude to the same complex of internal physical events and processes as causes of the behavior to be explained. True though this may be, the problem has to do, not merely with the events that are invoked in the explanations, but with their properties. As long as the mental properties alluded to in the intentional causal explanation of the action are viewed as irreducible to, and so distinct from, the physical properties of those physical events, the problem of explanatory competition remains.2 The explanations compete because each purports to causally explain the resulting behavior in terms of the causally relevant properties of its cause?the properties in virtue of which that cause brings about the effects it does?and each purports to be, at least in principle, a complete and independent explanation of that behavior.3 Let us call the problem in question here the qua problem?the problem that mental events that are physical events appear to be causally The notion of irreducibility invoked here is specific to accounts of reduction that require of a reduction that it effect a property-identity uniting the two domains (as in the account offered by Robert Causey, The Unity of Science (Boston: Reidel, 1977 ); Causey's "attributes'' are our properties). These have been called "conservative" reductions, the reduction preserving the reduced property. Property nonidentity and irreducibility go together on these accounts. Eliminative, or replacement, accounts of reduction are not relevant here, as they would ensure the irrelevance of the replaced properties. Ridgeview, 1989), pp. 77-108.) efficacious in the physical world qua physical but not qua mental.4 The problem here is not one of causal efficacy of events, but rather, one of what we shall call causal relevance of properties.5 And let us call the position on the relation between the mental and physical that gives rise to this problem minimalphysicalism. Minimal physicalism is the view that although each mental event or phenomenon is a physical event or phenomenon, mental properties are wholly distinct from physical ones. It is worth noting that minimal physicalism can generate problems not only for intentional explanations, but also for any other kinds of explanations, say biological ones, which make essential use of non physical properties in the proffered explanations. For any such set of explanations the question will arise: in virtue of which property/ies does the effect occur? The threat will be the same as it is in the mental case, that the nonphysical properties cited in the explanation do not produce the effect qua those properties. We are here concentrating on the mental, on intentional explanations and intentional proper relevance of properties, taking the former to concern events in extension, and the latter to concern both the qua problem and the explanatory potential of properties of events (see "Mental Causes and Explanation of Action," Philosophical Quarterly, xxxvi (1986): 145-58, reprinted in Leslie Stevenson, Roger Squires, and John Haldane, eds., Mind, Causation, and Action (New York: Blackwell, 1986 ), pp. 35-48, and "How to Be Psy chologically Relevant," in Macdonald and Macdonald, eds., Philosophy of Psychology: Debates on Psychological Explanation (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1995), pp. 60-77) . We now think that the problem that goes under the name of 'causal relevance' concerns the problem of how mental events can bring about effects in virtue of their mental prop erties (the qua problem, or the problem of "too little" causal relevance), and that this is an issue concerning the causal powers of mental properties. This issue is distinct from, though intimately related to, that of explanatory relevance. We also think that much of the criticism directed toward nonreductive monism, and in particular, the "too much" ties, because the threat has received its sharpest formulation, and has been most widely discussed, for this case. It has been argued that the problem does not have the general application we think it has, but whether it does or not will not be relevant to our proposed solution.6
That solution will generalize to other relevantly similar sets of ex planations, if there are any, as will become evident in section v. Minimal physicalism, and more specifically, nonreductive monism, has been discarded by many as a viable position on the mind-body relation on the grounds that it gives rise to, but cannot resolve, the problem of the causal relevance of the mental.7 In what follows, we want to defend a strategy?one that we argued for some time ago?
for solving this problem. Specifically, we want to defend the view that nonreductive monism can resolve the problem if it is combined with a certain metaphysical view of the nature of events, the property exemplification view. This defense contrasts with another, increas ingly popular, strategy for dealing with the problem, one that involves appeal to the view that mental events and other phenomena are, or involve, tropes. Those who endorse it think not only that the trope strategy can solve the problem of the causal relevance of the mental consistently with minimal physicalism, but also that appeal to other metaphysical views of events and properties (specifically, the property exemplification account) cannot do the job as well (if at all), so that appeal to trope theory has the explanatory edge over appeal to other metaphysical theories of events and properties.8
Since the view that nonreductive monism is a philosophically bank rupt position unless (and, perhaps, even if) it is combined with a trope conception of events and properties has become entrenched in the literature, we think it is time to set the record straight. In what follows we argue both against those who think that appeal to trope resolve the problem of the causal relevance of mental properties.
The charge of causal irrelevance against nonreductive monism has two aspects: one specifically concerns the qua problem?the problem of how mental events can bring about effects in virtue of their men tal properties (the "too little" causal relevance problem)?and the other concerns the complaint that the position cannot solve the qua problem in a way that does not lead to there being "too much" causal relevance for mental properties.
We begin, in section i below, by briefly outlining the position, pre suming the distinction, crucial to it, between causal efficacy of events and the causal relevance of properties of events, and explain how the qua problem arises. In sections 11 and hi, we clear the ground for our defense by exploring the trope-physicalist solution to the qua problem.
We argue that that appeal to trope theory does not effectively deal with it. In section iv we outline the version of the property exemplification account that we favor, and explain why the claim, made by those who appeal to the trope strategy, that appeal to this alternative account cannot help to solve the problem of the causal relevance of mental properties is false. Crucially, we argue that the property exemplification account has the resources to explain how mental properties of events could be causally relevant to the effects their instancings bring about without overdetermining them, and without competing for causal relevance with the physical properties of those events. Finally, in section v, we defend our own strategy for dealing with the problem of the causal relevance of the mental, making use of our version of the property exemplification account.
i. four theses
How exactly does the charge that mental properties are causally irrelevant arise? Suppose that the minimal physicalism (MP), described above, is true, each mental event or phenomenon being identical with a physical event or phenomenon. What makes the physicalism minimal is that the mental properties of mental/physical events, properties such as being pain, or being a coming to believe that it is getting dark, are assumed to be distinct from, and irreducible to, the physical properties of those events, such as being C-fibers' firing. Explanatory completeness is to be understood in terms of sufficient causation, so if c\ is causally sufficient for e\ there will be a description of c\ that will yield an independent and complete explanation of e\ (since there will be no c2 such that c\ and c2 are independent causes of e) ,12 The notion of "a description" of an event is too vague, however, as events will have many descriptions that do not yield any causal explanations of their effects, so a more precise account must limit the descriptions to those that mention causally relevant properties. This version of EXCL is a descendant of Kim's, and is similar to Yablo's property version of a principle he labels exclusion, which reads: "If a property X is causally sufficient for an event y, then no property X* distinct from Xis causally relevant to y."ls (Again, the notion of causal sufficiency is undefined, In short, the combination of PCR, EXCL, CLOS, and MCR appears to be inconsistent. If, then, we accept the former three principles, it seems that we must reject MCR and with it the view that mental properties of events are causally relevant to the effects those events bring about. But we want both to accept the former three principles and to accept MCR.
II. TROPES
The trope-physicalist claim is that appealing to trope theory offers a way of avoiding the charge that mental properties are causally irrelevant while maintaining PCR, EXCL, and CLOS, and, of course, the requirement on minimal physicalism that mental and physical properties are irreducibly distinct. In order to assess this claim, we need to know something about the theory of tropes on which it is based. particular size, shape, position, and so on. According to trope theory, these properties are particular properties of the bird. They are as particular as the bird itself; they are not particular instances of a property that can also be instantiated at the same or distinct times in other places or objects.
More precisely, in standard philosophical usage a property is construed as a universal, and an instance of a property is not a trope of that universal, but a thing that has (instantiates, exem plifies) that property. So a cardinal is an instance of the property of being red. For trope-theorists, however, the so-called particular redness of the cardinal, a trope, is not an instance of redness; it is a trope of redness. Just as the cardinal cannot be in more than one place at any given time?just as it is located all at once, wholly and completely, in the place it occupies at any given time?so too, its redness, its size and its shape cannot be in more than one place at any given time.
Tropes have been called by many names, one common one being "abstract particular." Keith Campbell tells us that resistance to the idea of a trope is based on a conflation of one pair of terms or con cepts, that of universal and particular, with another, that of abstract and concrete.17 This conflation is responsible for the belief that since to be universal just is to be abstract, to be particular just is to be con crete. On this basis, the possibility that there should exist things that are both abstract and particular is ruled out.
However, Campbell goes on to say, what is universal is so because it is possible for it to be wholly and completely in more than one spatial position at any given time. In contrast, what is particular can only be wholly and completely in one spatial position at a given time. stitute events and so are "parts" of them. If the latter, events are, like any other object, complexes of many distinct tropes. Either way, because mental tropes are identical with physical tropes, the claim is that there is no problem about the causal efficacy of mental events.
On both understandings of the trope conception, psychophysical event identity is guaranteed by psychophysical trope identity. Given that events are the relata of the causal relation, psychophysical trope identity guarantees the causal efficacy of mental events. What does the question of causal relevance of mental properties amount to on the trope conception, given minimal physicalism's commitment to the irreducibility of mental properties? It depends, since, on the trope conception, 'property' is ambiguous: it might mean either "trope" or "class of tropes." Depending on how it is interpreted, there will be a different way of understanding the question. Accordingly, there are two ways in which in the defense of MCR might be mounted.22 We will begin by considering the "class of tropes" interpretation.
According to this conception, mental properties or types are sets or classes of exactly resembling mental tropes, and physical properties correspondence) takes the instantiation relation to be a relation between a particular and a property, irrespective of whether the latter is understood as a universal or as a trope. Understood this way, tropes characterize events. For example, phenomenal events, such as pains, hurt, and so have phenomenal tropes, and intentional mental events, like thinkings, have contents, in that they are characterized by certain content tropes. However, given the distinction between causal efficacy of events and causal relevance of properties, this way of understanding the relation between an event and its trope-properties makes, say, the hurt-trope of a pain inefficacious in that event's bringing about the effects it does, and similarly for the content-trope of a thinking. Quite apart from the implausibility of this view, if tropes of events are inefficacious it is hard to see how they could be causally relevant, since it is natural to suppose that a necessary condition on causal relevance of a property (universal or trope) is that its instantiation is causally efficacious. The more natural (and more plausible) reading of "instantiate" for the trope theorist, then, is one according to which an event instantiates a trope by being constituted by it. Suppose that a necessary condition on causal relevance of a prop erty or type is causal efficacy of its property instance or trope. Then, on this understanding of what it is to be a mental type or property, to say that mental tropes that are identical with physical tropes are causally efficacious in virtue of their mental properties is to say that the mental tropes that comprise mental/physical events fall into two classes, a mental one and a physical one. Being physical tropes, they fall into a class of exactly resembling physical tropes. This class, class A, is determined to be the class it is in virtue of resemblance relations that hold between its members. The very same tropes that fall into this class (as well as ones that fall into other classes of physical tropes), however, fall into another, higher-level class, class B. They do so in virtue of falling into the first-level classes that they do. Class B is higher-level: it is a class of tropes whose members fall into it in virtue of falling into other classes of exactly resembling physical tropes. This class is a class of mental tropes, and it is a class whose members are physical tropes that are not exactly resembling It is crucial here that the resemblance relations binding class B's members together are not the same resemblance relations as those that bind the members of each first-level physical class together. The resemblances that bind the members of the higher-level class toge ther are themselves higher-level resemblances. Consider, again, the higher-level property, being soluble. Members of the class that, on the present version of the strategy, just is this property are exactly re sembling in this way: each thing (substance) that has (/is partly con stituted by) a member (trope) of that class is apt to dissolve if placed in a relevant liquid. The property itself is higher-level, because its members exactly resemble one another in this way in virtue of falling into other, chemical compound classes (for example, the NaClclass). Members of this lower-level class are chemical tropes. These very tropes, however, fall into higher-level classes in virtue of being mem bers of a class of exactly resembling chemical tropes.
Suppose, now, that we define a given mental property, or class of tropes, in terms of its causal role. Its members are occupants of that causal role; they are what discharge it. Then the claim is that physical tropes, which have physical properties in that they are members of physical classes, are the occupants of the causal role definitive of the mental property or class. It follows that mental tropes are phys ical tropes. This view we shall call trope functionalism, since it is a functionalist account of the relation between the mental and the physical, applied to tropes.24
There are several advantages to this position. This is so irrespective of whether one endorses the view that it is events that are the causal relata or whether one endorses the view that it is tropes that are the causal relata.
On a trope view, events are "bundles" of compresent tropes, so if mental events are causally efficacious, then mental tropes of mental events are causally efficacious.
soned because M is a higher-level property, whose causal relevance is purchased only by its members' (physical tropes) being physical (that is, being members of Pi).26
Suppose that the trope theorist responds by claiming that, since one and the same trope, Pi9 is (that is, is identical with) an instance of both Pi and M (that is, there is just one, physical trope here), if Pi is causally relevant so too is M. Then another, different problem arises. Consider once again the higher-level property, being soluble, and one of its lower-level realizing properties, being NaCl. All of the tropes that are members of the being NaCl class are also members of the being soluble class. Nevertheless, we want to say that the prop erties are distinct, since the former is a first-level class whereas the latter is a second-level one.
The problem is not that the strategy cannot ensure the distinctness of first-level and second-level properties, since it can.27 However, as the being soluble example makes plain, the distinction between higher level and lower-level properties does not by itself ensure that those The grounds given for this might be that the items doing the work are not the classes but their members (the tropes); and no member does anything in virtue of its class membership. Indeed, it might be claimed, it makes no sense to say that a given trope caused (or figured in a cause of) e in virtue of being in one class or another.
Pursuing this strategy seems to avoid both of the above charges. By rejecting the view that the problem of causal relevance of mental properties concerns property-types altogether, it apparently avoids the charge that the qua problem arises again at the level of property-types.
But it also appears to avoid the charge that MCR is jettisoned because there is no reason to think that higher-level classes of physical tropes are anything other than physical properties. For, according to the present way of understanding the problem of causal relevance of properties, though it may be true that higher-level classes of physical tropes are themselves physical property-types, it is irrelevant to the question of whether mental properties are causally relevant, this question being one that concerns individual tropes, not classes of tropes. Thus, irrespective of whether the trope strategy construes the issue of the causal relevance of mental properties to be one that concerns property-types (that is, classes of tropes), or one that concerns tropes alone, it cannot give an effective response to the charge that minimal physicalism leads to the causal irrelevance of mental properties. Its attempts to do so fail to engage with the problem of causal relevance of properties as posed at the outset of our discussion. instance of a property just is the thing that has it, we would have to say that Jones is the instance of the property, runs, since, according to the property exemplification account, as developed by Kim, this is a property of Jones, and so is a constitutive property of the event which is Jones's running. But although Kim wants to say that the subject of that event is Jones, the exemplification of the property runs by Jones is an event, a running, not the event's subject. We can avoid this problem altogether if we distinguish instances from instancings (that is, exemplifyings), since we can then maintain (1) that an instance of a property is the thing that has it (whether this is an object or an event), (2) that events just are (that is, are identical with) exemplifyings of dynamic properties of objects not of events, but of their subjects. For example, the event of my having pain now just is the exemplifying in me of a property of me, the property, has pain, now. Such properties are sometimes termed con stitutive properties of events, and are so termed because they are the properties of subjects whose exemplifyings in those subjects just are events. So when it is said that events "have" constitutive properties, this is not to be understood as the claim that they possess such properties.31
Events construed along these lines are sometimes referred to as "structured particulars." They are deemed so because they have not only constitutive properties, but also constitutive objects (or subjects) and constitutive times. That is to say, it is in the nature of any event to
be an exemplifying of a property (of its subject) in a subject at a time. 
Identity Condition: Event [x,P,t] is identical with event [y,Q,t'] if and only
if the object x is identical with the object y, the property P is identical with the property Q, and the time t is identical with the time t', in those objects, and (3) that an instance of a property of an event just is the event that has that property. Events, like any other entity, have properties by instantiating them, but their constitutive properties are not, according to PEA, properties that they possess. These distinctions are important to our solution to the problem of causal relevance, since only certain ways of developing the PEA will make that solution possible. For more on the distinction between static and dynamic properties, and the differences between We now prefer to avoid the term 'instances' entirely, since it suggests a trope view of properties, which we reject. But, since many parties to the dispute concerning the problem of mental causation (for example, Philip Pettit (The Common Mind: An Essay on Psychology, Society, and Politics (New York: Oxford, 1993)) and Kim himself (Supervenience and Mind, Mind in a Physical World)), regularly talk of events as instances of properties? intending the Universalist view of properties as multiply-exemplifiable entities that can be (wholly) present in many places at the same time?we will, for present purposes, speak in these terms too.
31 An event's constitutive property can no more be viewed as a property of it than its constitutive object can be viewed as a property of it. The claim that P is a constitutive
property of e entails, not that P is a property of e, but rather, that being an exemplify ing of P is a property of e. Thus, for example, the claim that the property, firing, is a constitutive property of the event which is Joe's firing a gun at t entails, not that firing is property of that event, but rather, that being an exemplifying of the property, firing, is a property of that event. 32 The exposition of the PEA here is based on this work of Kim's (see especially "Causation, Nomic Subsumption, and the Concept of Event," this journal, lxx, where xand y, Pand Q, and t and t', are variables ranging over objects, properties, and times, respectively.33 Descriptions of the form '[x,P,tY are known as canonical descriptions of events because they pick such events out in terms of their constitutive objects, properties, and times.
It is worth noting here that, although Kim himself assumes that events have only one, unique, constitutive property, the version of the account we favor, developed by Lawrence Lombard, allows for an event's having more than one constitutive property.34 This version is predicated on the assumption that events are paradigmatically and fun damentally changes, where these are not to be understood as states or persisting conditions. This assumption is founded on the intuition that some properties are such that their possession by an object at a time implies change, whereas others are not. Lombard labels these two sorts of properties "dynamic" and "static" respectively, and argues that only exemplifyings of the dynamic ones imply the existence of events.
(April 26, 1973): 217-36, and "Events as Property Exemplifications").
According to Kim, although the first condition is indispensable to the theory, the second, as for mulated, is not. The theory could proceed, for example, by defining the predicate 'is an event' over ordered w-tuples of objects, properties, and times. In this case, the or dered triple, <x,P,t>, would be an event if and only if xhas Pat t\ and the principles of set theory would guarantee the existence of the triple (assuming, of course, that x, P, and t exist). But Kim himself appears to favor the first method over the second, and it is certainly the preferable one from the point of view of the phenomenon of causal interaction between events, where this is assume to entail their positionality. 33 More precisely, objects that are minimal subjects of events, since, as stated in the text, we prefer the version of the account developed by Lombard in Events: A Metaphysical Study. According to this, an object, x, is the minimal subject of an event e if it is the minimally involved subject of e, where the notions of an object's involvement and minimal involvement in an event are defined as follows:
If xis any object, eis any event, and tis a time, then xh involved in eat ? ifand only if it is the case that if ? occurs (or is occurring) at t, then x changes (or is changing) at t, and a change in x at is identical with e at t, and If x is any object, e is any event, and <is a time, then x is the minimally involved subject of eat tif and only if (a) xis involved in eat t, and (b) xis the smallest object which is such that a change in x at t is identical with e at t {Events: A Metaphysical If a material substance has a dynamic property during an interval of time, then it will be true that that substance is changing during that interval from having one static property to having another. This will be true because a dynamic propertyjust is the property of first having one, then another, static property. Thus Lombard's version of the PEA, unlike Kim's, not only countenances the possibility that an event may have more than one constitutive property, but actually requires it.
The claim that events have constitutive objects, properties, and times,
should not be confused with the claim that they are in some way con stituted by or composed of objects, properties, and times.35 In this respect at least, describing events as "structured particulars" is mis leading. It invites us to view events as somehow composed of objects, properties, and times, related to each other in something like the way that a chair or any other complex physical object or, perhaps, biological organism is often viewed as composed of or constituted by its parts, arranged in a certain way. But the relationships that the "components" of events bear to one another are very different from the relations that the components of physical things bear to one another. In the case of an event, one component is exemplified by another, at yet another; and it is clear that, whatever the constituents of a biological organism or an artifact may be, they do not bear this relationship to one another.
For this reason, as well as others, talk of events as "structured par ticulars" is best avoided altogether, and the claim that the compo nents of events are constitutive of them should probably be understood as the claim that events have essentially the structure they have.36 In deed, Kim explicitly commits himself to some version of the latter? specifically, to the claim that events are essentially exemplifications of act or event properties at times in objects, and hence, that, for any event, e, being an exemplifying of an act or event property at a time in an object is an essential property of e. One reason for avoiding such talk is that it encourages the view that the PEA is a "reductive" account of events, a view that Kim himself is quick to deny. Thus, he says, "The account so far presented is not an 'eliminative' or 'reductive' theory of events; that is, it does not attempt to show that events are in some eliminative sense 'reducible' to substances, properties, and times...the account, however, attempts to tell us something about the metaphysical nature of events by relating them to such other ontological categories as substances, properties, and times" ("Events as Property
Exemplifications," p. 162). 37
Kim, "Events as Property Exemplifications," p. 173. Kim is also inclined, though not without qualification, to endorse the claim that each individual event has at least some of its constitutive components essentially, namely, its constitutive object and appear to follow from the two basic tenets of the PEA alone. For, irrespective of how the existence condition is interpreted, the mere exis tence of the relevant x, P, and Jare not enough to guarantee the existence of an event. No entity couldbe an event, according to this account, unless it was the exemplifying of a property at a time in a substance.
As the above discussion suggests, in addition to constitutive prop erties, events also have characterizing properties. These are proper ties that events possess, at least some of which they possess in virtue of having the constitutive properties they have. Thus, for example, the event that is my having pain now has the property of being a having of a pain. The event that is the exemplifying of the property, runs, in
Jones at time t, has as its constitutive property a property of Jones. That event has the property of being a running. Kim takes the constitutive properties of events as being the ones that figure in laws connecting the events that are the exemplifyings of them.38 His reason may be that it is these properties whose exem plifyings bring about, or cause, other events. However, in the context of our discussion of causal relevance, this claim is extremely odd. For the constitutive properties are properties of the subjects of events, not of events themselves. And, as we have construed it, the problem of the causal relevance of the mental concerns the question of whether mental (= physical) events cause the effects they do in virtue of their mental properties, properties of those events, such as that of being a thinking of Vienna. And the answer to this depends on a number of issues, one of which concerns the conception of "property" at work in the PEA, and another of which concerns the status of mental prop erties (of persons). We discuss these issues in turn. events is to say that each event which is (= is identical with) an exemplifying of a mental property of a subject in that subject at a time is identical with an exemplifying of a physical property of that subject in that subject at that time. Crucially, this amounts to the claim that there is just one exemplifying of two properties, one mental, and one physical, by an object at a time.39 That this is possible is apparent from determinable/determinate examples, such as that of being colored and being red. The most natural understanding of the relation be tween these properties is that for an object to instance the latter (being red) just is for it to instance the former (being colored): nothing further is required, once the latter is instanced, for the former to be instanced. Unlike the determinable/determinate property relation, the relation between mental and physical properties is not both metaphysical and conceptual. However, if, as seems likely, nonreductive monism is committed to the view that mental properties supervene on physical ones (in a sense shortly to be specified), the result is that mental properties of persons are not themselves consti tutive properties of the events that are (identical with) exemplifyings of them, but rather, supervene on those events' physical, constitutive properties (see note 39). And our view is that although the super venience relation is a weaker metaphysical relation than the deter By the extensionality of the causal relation, if the physical event is causally efficacious the mental one is. This shows that the PEA has the resources with which to rescue the causal efficacy of instances of mental properties, which on any plausible account is necessary for the causal relevance of the prop erties themselves. How does the PEA account for the causal relevance of mental properties? We have seen that, according to it, events have (characterizing) properties, and so exemplify properties as well as being the exemplifyings of properties. Given this, and given the Uni versalist understanding of properties to which PEA subscribes, whereby an exemplification of a property just is (that is, is identical with) the thing that has (exemplifies) it, exemplifications of mental properties of mental events are identical with exemplifications of physical properties of physical events (since each mental event is identical with a physical event). So, to say that a mental property of a physical event is causally relevant (that is, that a mental event is causally efficacious qua mental) is to say at least that an exemplifi cation of that property, that is, that event, is causally efficacious in bringing about an effect of that event. This will require that (mental) instance to be a physical instance, that is, will require one and the same event to be an instance of both a mental and a physical property.
We think that this requirement would need to be met anyway, since, on the Universalist conception of properties presumed by the PEA, things exemplify properties, and a thing just is (that is, is identical with) an instance of each property that it has.41 So, an event exemplifies all of its properties, and it is (that is, is identical with) an instance of every property that it has.42 Thus, our solution to the requirements on causal relevance with those on causal efficacy. How ever, this reply will be unsatisfying unless we can provide an account of causal relevance that makes only some of the properties exem plified relevant to some effects. Since, on our view, mental properties are higher-level ones, the causal relevance of such properties cannot be purchased independently of relations that they bear to certain (that is, physical) lower-level properties. CI, being blind to what more is required beyond causal efficacy for mental properties to be causally relevant, cannot help us to see how such properties can be brought within the domain of causally relevant properties along with lower level, physical ones, in a way that does not entail that every property of an event is causally relevant to any of its effects. Fortunately, a further thesis is available?one that has already been implicit in our dis cussion of causal efficacy of instances of mental properties?that ap plies specifically to higher-level and lower-level properties. Things?
objects, events, and other particulars?exemplify properties, but some properties they exemplify just by exemplifying others. Consider a red, square box. It has the properties of being red and being square.
It also has the property of being colored. It is (identical with) an instance of each property that it has. The box exemplifies the prop erties of being red, being square, and being colored. It does not exemplify the property of being square just by exemplifying the property of being red. But it does exemplify the property of being colored just by exemplifying the property of being red.43 Similarly, in the case of mental and physical properties of events, a mental event can exemplify the property, being a thinking of Vienna, just by exem plifying the property, say, being neuro-chemical event a. This view is reasonable independently of the issues surrounding mental cau PEA. What our development of the PEA suggests is that she will find it impossible to use this approach and to isolate the causal relata (property-instances) in the way she does, so as to protect the transitivity of the causal relation. See Paul, "Aspect Causation,'' this journal, xcvn, 4 (April 2000): 223-34. 43 But note that we do not think that the relation between mental and physical properties is a de terminable/determinate relation, as standard cases of this relation involve conceptual entailment of the determinable from the determinate property.
sation. Where one property (or properties) of an event is said to realize another property (or properties) of that event, this is by far the most plausible way to construe the relation between the proper ties exemplified.
Call this thesis the Property-Dependence Thesis, to distinguish it from the weaker Co-instantiation Thesis. It states:
(PD) When properties of events are related as higher-level to lower-level and the lower-level properties realize the higher-level ones, an event exemplifies the higher-level one just by exemplifying the lower-level one.
CI is weaker than PD, since, on the Universalist conception, all prop erties of an event are co-instantiated in a single instance. However, the stronger thesis entails the weaker one: where P is the physical property realizing mental property M, there will be just one instance of both P and M, Pb that is, M2.44
We are now nearly in a position to see how this understanding of the metaphysics of events can facilitate a reconciliation between MCR and PCR, EXCL, and CLOS, consistently with the view that mental prop erties are distinct from physical ones. A crucial further claim, noted above, is needed: mental properties whose exemplifyings are mental consequently, mental properties of events supervene on physical properties of events. Given the identity condition on events imposed by the PEA, nonreductive monism requires rejection of the view that mental properties are constitutive properties of the events that have them. But, independently of this, the position is committed to some kind of supervenience thesis, since without such commitment it is difficult to fend off the charge that the position is irredeemably dualist because it acknowledges the presence in the natural world, if not of nonphysical events, of free-floating nonphysical properties. Many will think that such a position does not deserve the name "physicalist."
What kind of supervenience thesis best captures the relation between mental and physical and physical properties is a thorny issue, as is well known.45 Still, for present purposes we can say this much. Take super   44 So, in what follows, when we claim that Pi =Mt-?that is, that there is one instance of both a mental property and a physical property where mental properties are not identical with, or reducible to, physical ones?we mean more than just that there is just one instance of both a mental property and a physical property (since on the Univer salist conception of properties, an event is just one instance of all of its properties). We mean that a mental event exemplifies Mjust by exemplifying P. 45
For some sceptical discussion of the value of appeal to psychophysical super venience, see, for example, Richard B. Miller ("Supervenience Is a Two- Way-Street," venience between the mental and the physical to be that relation which holds between a mental property or set of properties, Mand another, physical one, P, such that any two objects/events indiscernible with respect to P cannot diverge with respect to M. Further, following Kim, let us distinguish weak from strong supervenience.46 Then we can define a relation of strong supervenience thus:
(SS) M-properties strongly supervene on P-properties =df. where any x and y are M (/P) twins if and only if x and y are exactly alike with respect to their M (/P) properties.
Understood in this way, our claim is twofold: (1) mental properties of persons supervene on their physical properties, and so (2) mental properties of events supervene on their physical properties. This is consistent with the view that an individual event can be an exem plifying of both a mental and a physical property (of a person), can be an instance of both a mental property and a physical property (of an event), and can be an instance of a mental property just by being an instance of a physical property (of an event).
V. CAUSAL RELEVANCE
What was at stake in the previous section was whether the PEA is consistent with the possibility of mental properties' being causally relevant, where causal efficacy is a necessary but not a sufficient con (/P-properties) we mean the nonempty set, M \/P), of properties. We choose this ver sion over Kim's principally because it is weaker than his, though his entails it. Kim's implies that it is necessarily the case that if something has an M property, then it has some P property. But SS could be true if twins had no P property at all. It thus allows for the possibility that there might be purely mental worlds. We think this conse quence desirable, given that we take physicalism to be true and contingent, and given the variable realizability of mental properties. property P of an event c is causally sufficient for an effect e, then no other property Q, of c, distinct from and independent of P, is causally relevant for e, where a property's being causally sufficient for an effect means that an instance of that property is causally sufficient for that effect, and where a property's being causally relevant for an effect requires that an instance of that property is causally effective in bringing about that effect. What PD tells us is that an event can exemplify?that is, be an instance of?a mental propertyjust by being an instance of a physical property. Given this and CI, PEA is consistent with the possibility that mental properties are causally relevant? instances of mental properties can be causally effective?because they just are instances of properties that are causally sufficient. Given super venience, the mental property's causal relevance is compatible with its subvening physical property's causal sufficiency, and consistent with EXCL's requirements, since mental properties are distinct from but not independent of physical ones. ("Distinctness" satisfies the "non reductive" part of nonreductive monism, and we think that any viable physicalism will require dependence.)
We Second, we do not aim to provide a general account of causation?
though we do think that the metaphysics of events outlined above is important for any such general account. The aim, again, is to dem onstrate that the special difficulties that some think attach to the possibility of mental causation are not difficulties unique to mental causation. They arise in the context of trying to provide a perfectly general account of the conditions under which it is correct to judge either that c caused e, or that c is causally relevant to e. It may well be that the attempt to provide such a general account is itself mis taken, but if that is so it will not be because of any problem specific to mental causation. 48 We have said that the causal efficacy of instances of properties is a necessary condition for the causal relevance of the properties instanced.49 The issue of causal relevance is one that focuses on the properties, rather than their instances. To see what more is needed, it will be instructive to return to the original source of these debates, is a law "covering" the causing episode. Putting it in our preferred way, such a law will mention only some of the properties of the events involved in the particular causal affair, those properties of the cause that are "relevant" to the exemplification of certain properties in the effect.50 For Davidson, only physical predicates can be employed in such laws, leading to the suggestion that only physical properties could be causally efficacious, and hence causally relevant.
But it now becomes apparent that the problem of the causal relevance of properties is not one unique to the mental domain.
Suppose that we adhere, for the present, to the PNCC requirement on causal interactions. As mentioned above, this privileges only some of the properties of the related events, so it is plausible that some of the physical properties of those events will be "nonnomological," or will be specified in laws not germane to a particular cause-effect pair.
The law will be applicable because of only certain of the properties exemplified in the cause and its effect. For this causal transaction, then, some physical properties will be not relevant?will not be salient. The effect will be deemed to have occurred qua only those properties specified in the appropriate law. Or, more precisely, a property exemplified in the effect will be dependent on, or co-vary with, only some property or properties exemplified in the cause. So the problem of the causal relevance of mental properties dissolves into the more general problem of determining which of the properties in a specific interaction are causally significant and which not, no matter whether those properties are physical, chemical, mental, or anything else.
Given the generality of this problem, it would be churlish to insist that it be solved for mental causation before a general solution appears.
We can, however, say a bit more about why we think that mental properties are causally relevant, by looking at some examples of causings that are not covered by strict laws. Many recent accounts of causation attempt to extend the scope of causality to cover prob abilistic connections between events, and do so by saying that causes "raise the probability" of their effects. There seem to be counter examples to this: a golfer intends to hit the golf-ball into the hole, but slices horribly, the ball ricocheting off a conveniently situated tree and ending up in the hole. The sequence of events seems to be one in which the slice decreased the probability of the ball's ending up in the hole, but nevertheless the slice seems to have been a cause of that effect. The estimates of probability here, we claim, are estimates of the causal relevance of properties, relating the probabilities of se This is further illustrated in a recent discussion of probabilistic causation in which Christopher Hitchcock distinguishes between "two effects," a net effect and a component effect.54 Taking birth control pills containing estrogen has been said to raise the probability of thrombosis occurring while at the same time decreasing the risk of thrombosis by preventing pregnancy. In order to avoid the apparent contradiction, Hitchcock suggests that taking the pills is positive for thrombosis along one causal route (one effect of imbibing estrogen) and negative along another (a second effect, the prevention of pregnancy), where the notion of a "causal route" to an effect is termed a "component effect."
Combining the positive and negative component effects will, in this case (restricted to a specific population), yield a net negative effect: the chance of thrombosis (for the relevant population) is lowered.
Hitchcock's "component effect" is akin to our notion of causal relevance, although it needs to be noted that his distinction between However, for us, the event which is the assassin's shooting is causally efficacious, the property of being a shooting being a causally relevant property of the event.
Given that events exemplify diverse properties, it will be true that only some of the properties of the cause will be relevant to some of the properties of the effect. Which properties are relevant in any particular case will be discovered empirically, and, so far as we can see, there is nothing to prevent the discovery that mental properties are causally relevant. Of course, even when exemplified, they may not be relevant to some effect-properties, but they are not unique in this respect. Some properties exemplified in nonmental causings are not relevant to some of their effect-properties either, this just being a consequence of any metaphysics of events that allows for an event to be an exemplification of many properties.
Consider, for example, a window that shatters when a rock of 5 lbs or more impacts on it at 10 mph or more, and so shatters because it is struck by a 7 lb rock thrown at 10 mph. It is causally relevant that the rock weighs over 5 lbs, even though this instance of weighing over 5 lbs is also an instance of weighing over 2 lbs. The throwing of a rock weighing over 2 lbs will not explain the window's shattering, though in this case the instance of the property, weighing over 2 lbs, just is the instance of weighing over 5 lbs (= the instance of weighing 7 lbs), and so was causally implicated in the shattering. This property, weighing over 2 lbs, does not help explain the shattering because other in There remains, however, a potentially serious objection, one stem ming from the role played by the PNCC. Critics may agree that mental properties will not be unique in sometimes being causally irrelevant, but insist that, given the PNCC and the anomalousness of the mental (that is,that mental properties do not figure in causal laws), they are unique in never being causally relevant. That they might, on particular occasions, join other, physical, properties in being causally irrelevant will be of little comfort if they are, by their nature, never relevant.
But this will be so only if we concede two claims. The first is that the mental is anomalous, and the second is that causal relevance can be secured only by nomologicality. Both claims can be and have been con tested. Some have modified the first claim by distinguishing between "strict" and "loose" laws, making much of the use of'" ceteris paribus" laws in the special sciences. It would be open to a proponent of the PNCC to loosen one's understanding of "law" so as to include these less-strict laws in the "N" part of the PNCC, thus still allowing that Principle the role of sole bestower of causal relevance. As long as mental properties were to figure in these loose laws, that would permit their causal relevance.
There may well be ways of pursuing this strategy so as to allow for mental causal relevance, in the process diminishing the tension be tween the PCR and MCR. But with this tension in mind, we prefer to challenge the second claim, that the PNCC is the sole guarantor of the causal relevance of properties. First, it is worth noting that the And again, there is no reason to see these different co-variation relationships as excluding one another. At least they do not compete simply in virtue of being different properties. They can co-exist harmoni ously. In the mental case, this is guaranteed by the Property Dependence thesis (PD) and the other principles at play that together ensure that the physical properties of an event that realize a mental property will not conflict with the causal power of the mental property.
Any remaining doubt may take this dependency to be the problem rather than part of the solution. It may be thought that PD ensures that the physical property/ies will eclipse the relevance of the dependent mental property. But this is not true: it is because PD is weaker than reduction?variable realization is accepted?that mental causal relevance remains. The systematic co-variation between exem
Hitchcock, "The In transitivity of Causation Revealed in Equations and Graphs." At one point Hitchcock goes explicitly rational: "Given that he did not push the button with his right hand, why should the dog bite make any difference to whether he pushes it with the left? He wanted the bomb to explode, would he not push the button with his left hand regardless of whether the dog bit his right?" p. 292.
plified mental properties is not a simple "upward reflection" of what happens at the level of the realizing physical properties. For it to be such an "upward reflection" would require the identity of mental and physical properties, and it would need an independent argument to support any such identity claim. We maintain that the identity claim cannot be supported by arguments using the causal irrelevance of the mental as an essential premise; not without begging the question.66
Causal relevance, then, is ubiquitous, and would remain so even if the world were shorn of higher-level properties. The causal relevance of a property, P, requires at least that instances of P are causally efficacious and that there are objective patterns, possible systematic co variations among properties, in which Pparticipates. Mental properties can satisfy these conditions, and that the pattern exemplified between, say, an intention and an action is one of rationality, or intelligibility, does not preclude the causal relevance of the intention to the perfor mance of that action. So it turns out that the causal relevance of mental properties is no more mysterious than is causal relevance in general.
VI. CONCLUSION
The problem of mental causation divides into the problem of the causal efficacy of mental events and the problem of the causal rel evance of mental properties. We have argued that the former prob lem can be satisfactorily settled by adopting either a metaphysics of tropes or a version of the Property Exemplification Account (PEA) of events, but only the PEA can provide the foundations for an account of mental causal relevance. Regarding the latter we have claimed that a property, P, is never causally relevant without there being another property relative to which it is causally relevant, so the question of which properties of events are the causally relevant ones is not one that can be answered tout court and independently of the types of effects that they bring about. This is a general difficulty of deter mining which properties of a cause are relevant to which properties of an effect, not one specific to mental causal relevance.
This suggests that concerns arising from Exclusion (EXCL) are overstated. For EXCL states that if there is a property, P, whose instance in an event c is causally sufficient for an effect e, then there can be no other distinct and independent property, Q that is causally relevant 
